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Environmental Ethics: Theory and Implications 
for Marketing 
 
Raymond Benton, Jr., Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA 
 
Many marketers recognize they have obligations toward the non-human world, 
obligations which are not fully understood. This essay sheds light on how such marketers 
can justify their own feelings and persuade others. The essay begins with the historical 
rise of environmental consciousness before discussing the two most influential of the 
Western ethical theories: Kantianism and utilitarianism. It then discusses their 
shortcomings before moving on to the sentimentalist approach to ethics that comes down 
to us from David Hume and Adam Smith. A direct line from the sentimentalist approach 
is drawn to the environmental/ecological ethics of Aldo Leopold. Much is left out of this 
essay; virtue ethics, social contract theory, or any of the strictly environmental 
philosophies that have emerged (deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology, 
bioregionalism). Neither are any of the spiritual or religious approaches to 
environmental ethics discussed. 
 
If you’re not depressed, I often joke to my students, it’s only 
because you haven’t been reading the newspaper. And indeed we 
do live in a frightening time, marked by fundamentalist violence, 
aggressive wars, ethnic conflict, starvation amid plenty, and the 
subject of this book: enormously pervasive environmental 
problems. 
Roger S. Gottlieb, A Greener Faith: Religious 
Environmentalism and Our Planet’s Future (2006, 
p. vii).  
 
 For the most part, we have cared little about our impact on the environment. The 
past century, and especially the past fifty years, has witnessed an increasing awareness 
that we can and are causing significant harm to the rest of nature. That awareness has 
understandably been accompanied by an increasing acceptance that we have obligations, 
moral obligations, toward the rest of nature. This unsettling awareness and sense of 
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obligation has given rise to the sub-discipline of environmental ethics,1 or what I prefer to 
call ecological ethics.2    
 Both an awareness of and concern that we, as human beings, can and have caused 
harm to the rest of nature can be found as far back as the ancient Greeks (Hughes 1975; 
Hughes 1994; Westra and Robinson 1997). The contemporary awareness that we impact 
nature is often dated to 1864 and the publication of George Perkins Marsh’s Man and 
Nature, a second edition of which was published in 1874 with a more descriptive title: 
The Earth as Modified by Human Action: Man and Nature. Henry David Thoreau had 
already published Walden, in 1854 and John Muir was writing his books in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s. In 1949 Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac was published. The 
final chapter of A Sand County Almanac is entitled “The Land Ethic,” an essay which is 
obligatory reading by anybody interested in the topic. Thus, in a period of about a 
hundred years, concerned people were raising our environmental awareness and 
environmental concern and urging us toward an environmental ethic.  
 It was not until the 1960s that concern for the environment turned into an 
organized and popular movement. Many consider the turning point to have been Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring, published in 1962, the same year that Murray Bookchin (writing 
under the name Lewis Herber) published Our Synthetic Environment (1962). These were 
followed by economist Kenneth Boulding’s “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship 
Earth” (1966), Lynn White’s “The Historical Root of Our Ecological Crisis” (1967), Paul 
R. Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968), Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” 
                                                          
1 There are now many good textbooks on the subject, and some actually directed at the 
professions. I have listed these, and others, following the references.  
2 There is precedent for this preference: see Rolston 1975; Kohák 2000; Curry 2006.  
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(1968) and his “The Economics of Wilderness” (1969), Barry Commoner’s The Closing 
Circle (1971), Dr. Seuss’s The Lorax (1971), Edward Goldsmith’s Blueprint for Survival 
(1972), the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth (1972) and E.F. Schumacher’s Small is 
Beautiful (1973). Each is now considered a modern classic.  
 Landmark legislation also began to appear: The Clean Air Act of 1970 (based on 
a 1963 law), the formation of U.S. Environmental Protection Administration (1970), the 
Clean Water Act of 1972 (based on the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act) and 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973. The first United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment was held in Stockholm (1972). The U. N.’s World Commission on 
Environment and Development (W.C.E.D.) issued its report, Our Common Future, in 
1987. The first Earth Summit was held in Rio (1992), followed by the Johannesburg 
Earth Summit (2002) and Rio+20 in 2012. 
 Non-governmental organizations also increased their activity during the 1960s. It 
1966 David Brower and the Sierra Club placed the famous Sistine Chapel advertisements 
in the New York Times and other newspapers, effectively stopping, by inciting public 
outrage, the move to build dams that would flood the Grand Canyon (Sierra Club 2014). 
New groups, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, World•Watch, Earth First, Earth 
Island Institute, National Resource Defense Council, the Nature Conservancy and others 
began forming during the 1960s and 1970s. The first Earth Day was on April 22, 1970.  
 J. Baird Callicott taught the first environmental ethics class ever taught, anywhere 
in the world, in 1971 (Callicott 1987, p. vii; Lo 2009, p. 129). In 1973 the Australian 
philosopher, Richard Routley (later writing as Richard Sylvan), published the first paper 
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on environmental ethics by a professional philosopher (Routley 1973).3  The title of his 
paper asked,  “Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?”  In 1974 John 
Passmore, another Australian philosopher, published the first book-length treatment of 
environmental ethics, Man’s Responsibility for Nature. The first American paper on 
environmental ethics was by Holmes Rolston III (1975). From these beginnings emerged 
the philosophy sub-discipline of environmental ethics. A similar explosion in the 
literature occurred in religion studies, too. Two early papers were Walter Lowdermilk’s 
“The Eleventh Commandment,” published in 1940 and Joseph Sittler’s 1954 article, “A 
Theology for Earth.”4   
 Marketing did not escape this influence. George Fisk’s Marketing and the 
Ecological Crisis was published in 1974 and Karl Henion’s Ecological Marketing in 
1976. Michael Polonsky and Alma Mintu-Wimsatt edited a comprehensive volume, 
Environmental Marketing: Strategies, Practice, Theory, and Research in 1995. The first 
chapter of this volume addressed “Ecological Imperatives and the Role of Marketing” 
(Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995) and the fourth chapter proposed a “Paradigm Shift in Values 
to Include the Environment” (Neace 1995). More recent textbooks have used the rhetoric 
of sustainability to bring environmental concern to marketing. The first was perhaps 
Donald Fuller’s Sustainable Marketing: Managerial-Ecological Issues (1999). A decade 
later Frank-Martin Belz and Pen Peattie published Sustainability Marketing (2009), 
followed by Diane Martin and John Schouten’s Sustainable Marketing (2012) and Mark 
Peterson’s Sustainable Enterprise: A Macromarketing Approach (2013).  
                                                          
3 There was one earlier but largely neglected paper entitled “Ethics and the Beetle” 
(MacIver 1948).  
4 I have also listed some of the books on religion and the environment following the 
references.  
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 These lists are incomplete: my point is not. Increasingly we are coming to 
understand that humans cause environmental problems and that, while some things have 
gotten better since the 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s, there is still cause for alarm and concern.  
 This contribution to the Handbook on Ethics in Marketing is for marketers with 
an environmental or ecological consciousness that are unsure how to talk about the moral 




 Confucius in China, Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) in India and Socrates in 
Greece each lived at about the same time (in what is called the Axial Age, roughly five or 
six hundred years before the common era (BCE). Each gave rise to a historically 
important philosophical tradition.5  One difference between the traditions, the Eastern and 
the Western is that the Western tradition developed a decidedly individualistic approach 
to ethics (Gunn 1983) while the others made room for a consideration of the whole.  
 The Western philosophical tradition is concerned with human beings; indeed, 
with individual human beings. Only the individual human being has moral status. This 
position is arrived at by one of two primary routes. One is to claim that only human 
beings have certain special characteristics, like rationality or the ability to use language. 
Since only humans have these characteristics, only humans deserve moral consideration. 
A second route is to claim that moral relationships can only exist between reciprocating 
                                                          
5 As in so many things, anthropologists challenge the notion that before the rise of the 
great philosophical traditions there was no such thing as philosophy or philosophical 
thinking. See, in particular, Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher (1927).  
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entities. Since a wolf or a wild flower cannot reciprocate, they do not warrant moral 
consideration from us.  
 Part of the challenge facing environmental ethics, then, is to find a way or ways to 
extend moral consideration to the rest of nature. As Patrick Curry wrote, ethical questions 
“can no longer be restricted to how to treat other human beings, or even animals, but 
must embrace the entire natural world” (2006, p. 1).  
 I argue for a particular approach, Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic (1949). I do this, in 
part, because we can draw a direct line of descent from Adam Smith to Aldo Leopold, 
thereby putting Leopold squarely in the tradition upon which marketing, itself, rests. I do 
not believe we are ready, however, for an environmental/ecological ethic. Yet I do not 
despair. Victor Hugo (1802-1885) is often quoted as having written, “Nothing is more 
powerful than an idea whose time has come.”  The time for an environmental/ecological 
ethic is around the corner; its time is near; its time will come. When the time is here, 
marketers will be ready because they will have already thought about it. They will not be 
caught off guard.  
 
Mainstream Ethical Theories 
 
 Mainstream philosophical ethics tends to be one of two varieties: utilitarianism or 
Kantian. As applied to environmental issues, both have tried to solve environmental 
problems in language and concepts derived from traditional, human-centered ethics. A 
third thrust in the Western tradition is that of the Scottish Enlightenment, chief 
representatives of which include David Hume and Adam Smith. I deal first with 
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utilitarianism and then with Kantianism before coming to this sentimentalist school of 
ethics.  
 
Utilitarianism   
 
 Utilitarianism is likely the most familiar ethical theory to marketers because 
economics is thoroughly utilitarian. Marketing, related as it is to economics, is also 
thoroughly utilitarian. The utilitarian maxim is well known: “act so as to produce the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Jeremy Bentham), or, alternatively, “Actions 
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce 
the reverse of happiness” (John Stuart Mill). In both cases happiness was understood as 
the presence of pleasure or the absence of pain. Bentham made no distinction between 
higher or lower pleasures but was concerned with the sheer quantity of pleasure. Thus his 
quip, “The quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry.” Mill was as 
concerned about qualitative differences in pleasures as he was the quantity of them. His 
counter quip, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” 
 Modern utilitarians refer to preferences and interests rather than pleasure and 
pain. The goal of human action becomes the maximization of welfare, understood as the 
maximization of preference satisfaction. People reveal their preferences through their 
actions and what they overwhelmingly reveal are preferences for goods and services. 
Accordingly, the maximization of collective satisfaction, and thereby the maximization of 
collective happiness, becomes the maximization of consumption.   
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 Utilitarianism focuses on the greatest happiness of the greatest number of human 
beings. Everything else is valuable only as a means to producing pleasure for us. William 
Baxter gave infamous expression to this when, in the context of discussing the impact of 
the agricultural use of DDT on animals and birds, he wrote,  
damage to penguins, or sugar pines, or geological marvels is…simply 
irrelevant…Penguins are important [only] because people enjoy seeing them 
walk about the rocks (1974, p. 5).  
Everything central to the environmentally concerned person—animals, trees, rivers, 
rocks, forests, ecosystems, geological marvels—are of no value unless they serve our 
needs. That is a people centered ethic; it is not an environmental or ecological ethic. Lisa 
Newton captured this in her observation that no traditional ethic will capture our duties to 




 The other principal ethical theory is that of Immanuel Kant. Kant argued, contrary 
to utilitarianism, that consequences are irrelevant to whether an action is good or bad, 
right or wrong. Kant would have said, Do the right thing and worry not about the 
consequences; let the chips fall where they may.     
 But what is the right thing?  The rightness of an act is determined by whether the 
actor can honestly say that he or she would want everyone else to act in that way. If so, 
the action is right. If not, the action is wrong. The potential or realized consequences of 
the act are irrelevant.  
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 In Kant’s view, rational people will not be prepared to adopt a rule for themselves 
unless they were prepared to accept it as applicable to and by all people. If I choose to act 
in a certain way, I must agree that I must allow others to act in a similar manner. We have 
a duty, an obligation, to act rationally. This has been likened to the Golden Rule: treat 
others the way you want them to treat you (or, in the negative, do not treat others in ways 
that you do not want them to treat you). The reciprocity issue can readily be seen here.  
 Another Kantian approach is that people should never be treated merely as a 
means to an end but, rather, as having ends of their own. We have ends of our own 
because we are rational, can think and plan for our own future. Since all else is non-
rational, all else can be treated as a means to our end. As philosophers express it, people 
(rational beings) have intrinsic value (value in and of themselves); all else has 
instrumental value (value that derives from serving another’s end). Or, as I believe it was 
Descartes that expressed it, human beings have value; everything else has a price.  
 To summarize, human beings deserve to be treated morally, which means they 
deserve to be treated as an end and not merely as a means to an end. Everything else—
animals, trees, rocks, rivers, forests, ecosystems, geological marvels—can be treated as a 
means to another’s end. That end is our end, our purposes.  
 
Implications for Marketers  
 
 The implications of this general thrust of traditional ethics for marketers are pretty 
straightforward. If we are to maximize satisfaction, happiness and pleasure, and if people 
reveal their preferences, through their actions in the marketplace, as preferences for 
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goods and services (the output of industry), then in pursuing the good and the right, 
marketers have a duty to satisfy, as a marketing textbook once put it, “peoples’ desires 
for goods and services as they, themselves, define and express those desires” (Stanton 
1981). If environmental concern is central to enough people, if people develop a 
preference for penguins over popcorn and petroleum, they will express that concern and 
those preferences through their purchases. Marketers will be listening and paying 
attention and will accommodate those preferences when, and if, they are expressed—but 
not before. This approach is woven into the very fabric of marketing theory and practice.  
 For those marketers with an environmental concern, this is inadequate. Even 
Stanton waffled toward the end of that same textbook when he wrote (1981, p. 558),  
In considering the marketability of a new product, marketing executives may 
stop asking, ‘Can it be sold.’  Instead, they may ask, ‘Should it be sold? Is it 
worth the cost to society?’  
As I pointed out before (Benton 1985), if marketers are to ask should something be sold, 
it is implied that there exists some criteria, some ethical theory, regarding human and 
social well-being by which we can justify that assessment. Generally people want that 
their actions be good and right—that they are ethical. We also want to be able to defend 
our actions to others. Today any such theory must include not just social well-being but 
the well-being of the non-human natural environment. To this point there is no theory by 
which marketers can ask themselves if something should be sold. All they can do, to this 
point, is refer to the standard refrain that it should be sold if enough people want it and 
will buy it. We are not to judge of the tastes and preferences of other people.    
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Extending Mainstream Ethical Theories  
 
 Many have argued that the bounds of consideration should and can be extended 
beyond the human being. They argue that a proper understanding of utilitarianism and 
rights theory requires expanding the sphere of the morally considerable to include beings 
other than existing humans. All such efforts attempt to extend the moral community on 




 Under the guise of the original pleasure/pain principle, utilitarianism can embrace 
some parts of the non-human sphere since some animals can and do experience pleasure 
and, more especially, pain. Bentham was aware of this and advocated it because animals 
experience pain and the point is to maximize pleasure, which is tantamount to 
minimizing pain. Bentham was unconcerned about what experienced the pain: humans or 
hedgehogs. The point is to minimize it. As he wrote (1789):  
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those 
rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of 
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is not 
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice 
of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized that the number of the 
legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons 
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else 
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




is it that could trace the insuperable line?  Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps 
the faculty of discourse?  But a full-blown horse or dog is beyond comparison a 
more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a 
week, or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it 
avail?      
Bentham’s first step to expanding the bounds of moral consideration, therefore, was to 
embrace all sensitive, or sentient, beings—those with a capacity to experience pain. The 
preceding passage concluded with Bentham’s perhaps most quoted passage: ‘The 
question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer’ (the emphasis 
is Bentham’s).  
 Despite the fact that Bentham explicitly argued that animal suffering should be 
included in the utilitarian calculus, in practice mainstream utilitarians have only 
considered human pleasure and human pain. Including the suffering of others 
significantly alters the calculations, as Lisa Newton clearly pointed out (2005, p. 82):  
Utilitarianism, the only philosophy that truly supports rights for non-human 
animals, asks that we seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the 
long run. Happiness of what?  The costs and benefits of whaling come out very 
differently if you count the happiness of the whales into the equation.  
 Peter Singer was among the first to forcefully include animal suffering in the 
utilitarian calculus. In Animal Liberation (1975) he argued, as did Bentham, that any 
being capable of suffering has an interest in avoiding suffering and that any being with 
interests deserves to have those interest taken into account by others with similar 
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interests. Pain is pain no matter what experiences it—people, penguins or possums. The 
interests of all sentient beings should receive consideration in our utilitarian calculations.      
 The problem, however, lies in drawing the boundary. What is a sentient being?  
Humans, certainly. Horses, too. But where do we stop?  Line them up: deer, wolves, 
coyotes, rabbits, rats, birds, snakes, fish, worms, snails, slugs, bugs, bacteria, viruses, 
trees, meadows, rivers. On the basis of pain and suffering, where do we draw the line?  
What do we include and what do we exclude from the moral community?   
 
Sentience   
 
 When most people read or hear the word sentient they likely think of pain and 
suffering. Sentient, however, has a more general meaning: to be conscious of something 
(and not only of pain and suffering). Working from this wider meaning of the word 
sentient, there are at least two attempts to extend moral consideration within standard 
Western ethical philosophy (see Varner 2001). 
 Moral rights function to protect interests. In order to have rights, an entity must be 
able to consciously aim at—to think about—its own interests. To do so presupposes at 
least rudimentary cognitive abilities. We now know that not all non-human animals lack 
rationality, if by that we mean an ability to solve practical problems in a logical, if 
rudimentary, way (Griffin 2001; Morell 2013; Wasserman and Zentall 2006; Woods 
2010). Therefore, because they share with us at least some of the characteristics by which 
we ascribe rights to ourselves they, too, deserve moral consideration. Logical consistency 
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requires us to ascribe rights to at least some animals, too. Trees, plants, rocks and rivers 
are excluded because of they lack cognitive abilities.  
 A second approach attempts to include at least trees and plants. This approach 
accepts that for all living things there are conditions that are good for them and conditions 
that are bad for them. Hence, all living things have a good of their own and, therefore, all 
living things have interests (an interest in living) and therefore deserve moral 
consideration.  
 Albert Schweitzer (1929) is one of the early proponents of this sort of view. He 
reported having a profoundly moving experience watching four hippopotamuses and their 
young plod along. This experience led him to see that all life possesses the same will-to-
live that every human being possesses. Once we recognize that all life has the same will-
to-live that we find in ourselves and in other people, we will see that morality requires 
that all life be respected, not just human life. Schweitzer argued for what he called 
‘reverence for life’ ethic.  
 
Summary and Implications   
 
 Because of Singer’s (1975) and Regan’s (1983) persuasively argued views we 
now scrutinize factory farming and have eliminated some animal testing. They extended 
the boundaries of the moral community to include not just humans but all those with at 
least some of the characteristic by which we ascribe rights to ourselves—the capacity to 
experience pain or at least some level of cognitive capacity or having an interest in 
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continuing to live. They have drawn attention to their moral right to be free from human 
induced pain and suffering, and their moral right to life.   
 Each of these extensions expands the moral community, yet much remains left out 
because of the necessity of drawing boundaries. In addition, both emphasize, to the 
exclusion of all else, the individual—the individual person, the individual animal, the 
individual tree (Gunn 1983, Marietta 1993). Left out, even from these extended versions, 
are species preservation, air and water pollution, and ecosystem integrity—just those 
things that are centrally important to those with environmental concerns. In none of these 
extended views are species or ecosystems candidates for moral standing. It is this basic 
feature of traditional ethics, Varner notes, that “has played a major role in their rejection 
by many prominent environmental ethicists” (Varner 2001, p. 195).  
 Despite these limitations, even these extensions have important implications for 
marketers and for marketing educators. For example, when conducting an environmental 
scan it is not enough to consider only the social, economic, technological, competitive 
and regulatory environments—the now standard elements of the marketing environment. 
To assess the opportunities and threats to an organization, marketers must now add, as a 
new element in the marketing environment, at least some elements in the non-human 
natural environment. Marketers must not ask simply how the non-human natural 
environment impacts them or their organization, but how they and their organization 
impact the living beings that comprise the non-human natural environment. When 
marketers do that, they may come up with a different answer to the question, “Should it 
be sold.”  Marketers might also find that they are not compelled to always take their 
marching orders from the consumer.  
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 To do this, however, the standard sequence in most marketing textbooks must be 
revised. The chapter on marketing ethics, which often follows the chapter on conducting 
a marketing scan, will have to come first. The reasons why marketers should consider the 
non-human natural environment must be explained before students receive instruction in 
conducting the marketing scan. And, of course, the standard textbook treatment of 
marketing ethics will have to be expanded beyond the utilitarian atomistic and 
chauvinistic social philosophy in which marketing ethics are embedded.  
 
An Evolutionary Approach to Ethics Based on Sentiments 
 
 Most Western moral philosophy—utilitarianism, rights theory, social contract 
theory—accepts our ability to reason is the source and origin of ethics. At some time in 
the past people decided it was better to establish codes for ethical behavior—to accept a 
limitation on human freedom—than to continue in the proverbial Hobbesian war of all 
against all.  
 The problem with this account of the origin of ethics is that it has the cart before 
the horse. Our ability to reason cannot possibly have evolved apart from an intensely 
social context, and such a context—nay, society, itself—cannot possibly have existed in 
the absence of some moral restraints, some limitations on freedom of action in the so 
called struggle for existence. Something, civil law or codes of proper conduct, had to 
already exist to hold the society together.6   
                                                          
6 In anthropology there has been a parallel discussion regarding the origins of culture. 
The classic account held that there was a critical point in the evolution of Homo sapiens 
when culture was added on to a completed or nearly completed biological being. At this 
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 If our ability to reason is not the source and origin of ethics and morality, from 
whence do they come?  David Hume, Adam Smith and others—those that make up the 
Scottish Enlightenment—located the source and origin of morality not in reason but in 
sentiments, in fellow feeling, sympathy, benevolence, affection, generosity. Hence the 
title of Adam Smith’s first book, Theory of Moral Sentiments.7   
 David Hume declared, in A Treatise of Human Nature (originally published in 
1739-1740),8 reason is not a motive to human action—neither right actions nor wrong 
actions. Rather, “moral good and evil are … distinguish’d by our sentiments, not by 
reason” (1978, p. 589, emphasis in the original). Human actions, both good and bad, are 
motivated by other-oriented sentiments: sympathy, fellow feeling and benevolence. 
These are just as much a part of the human psychological constitution as are the self-
oriented sentiments of greed and lust. As Callicott (1982, p. 167) explained Hume’s 
views,  
The moral sentiments are both natural and universally distributed among human 
beings…In other words, like physical features—the placement of the eyes in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
critical point biological evolution stopped (or nearly stopped) and cultural evolution took 
over. The problem is that the archaeological record suggests that such a moment never 
occurred and that rather than sequential development it was a co-evolutionary 
development of the biological and the cultural (see Geertz 1973, pp. 61-69).   
7 The Theory of Moral Sentiments was first published in 1759 and went through six 
editions, the last of which was published in 1790. Smith’s other book, An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, was first published in 1776 and went 
through five editions, the last of which was in 1789, the year before the sixth edition of 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith died in 1790.  
8 A Treatise of Human Nature consists of three books. The first two were published in 
1739. Book III was published in 1740.  
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head, two arms, two legs an opposed thumb, etc.—the moral sentiments are only 
slightly variable psychological features common to all people.  
Just as people have similar yet slightly variable physical features, so, too, “the moral 
sentiments are only slightly variable psychological features common to all people.”  And 
just as there are physically “freakish or maimed” people, so, too, “there may be people 
who, because of congenital defect or the vagaries of life, are lacking one, several, or all of 
the moral sentiments to one degree or another.”   
 Hume was unconcerned with the origins of ethics. He simply claimed that the 
moral sentiments are natural, universal and fixed psychological characteristics of human 
nature (Callicott 1982). Charles Darwin, however, was interested in the origins of ethics 
and morality and he relied on Hume, Smith and Bain for his evolutionary psychology.9  
Callicott (p. 165) states, “no other available analysis of morals than Hume’s would have 
been useful to Darwin” and, Antony Flew notes (1967, p. 59), Hume’s approach to moral 
questions “might almost seem to demand an evolutionary background.”   
 Darwin’s argument in the third chapter of The Descent of Man10 was that (quoting 
Callicott) “the moral sentiments (fellow feeling, sympathy, benevolence, affection, 
generosity) … co-evolved with the evolution of protohuman societies. On the subject of 
“the all-important emotion of sympathy” Darwin (1871, p. 81) writes: 
                                                          
9 Charles Darwin is most known for On the Origin of Species (1859). He also published 
The Descent of Man (1871). The third chapter of The Descent of Man discusses the issue 
of the origins and functions of morality.       
10 I use a reprint of the first edition (1871). In the second edition of The Descent of Man 
this is chapter four. In both editions the chapter is entitled “Comparison of the Mental 
Powers of Man and the Lower Animals—continued.”   It is in this chapter that Darwin 
references David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Adam 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and Alexander Bain’s Mental and Moral 
Science (1868). 
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In however complex a manner this feeling may have originated, as it is one of 
high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one another, it will 
have been increased through natural selection; for those communities, which 
included the greatest number of sympathetic members, would flourish best, and 
rear the greatest number of offspring. (1871, p. 82)   
The moral sentiments, in short, have survival value. As Darwin expressed it (1871, p. 93),  
No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, treachery, etc., were common; 
consequently such crimes within the limits of the same tribe ‘are branded with 
everlasting infamy;’ but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits.  
Similarly, regarding truth telling Darwin wrote (1871, p. 95),  
There cannot be fidelity without truth; and this fundamental virtue is not rare 
between the members of the same tribe…; but to lie to your enemy has rarely 
been thought a sin, as the history of modern diplomacy too plainly shews [sic].  
Darwin concludes (1871, pp. 96-97),  
actions are regarded by savages, and were probably so regarded by primeval 
man, as good or bad, solely as they affected in an obvious manner the welfare of 
the tribe,—not that of the species, nor that of man as an individual member of 
the tribe.  
 Hume does not abandon reason; its role is to guide the passions. Reason guides 
our passions and sentiments in two ways. First, it excites a passion by informing us of the 
existence of something that is the proper object of the passion. Second, it discovers the 
connections of causes and effects, thereby providing us the means of exerting a passion. 
But it is our feelings, our sentiments, which serve as the ultimate foundation of our moral 
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




judgments. Distinctions of good and evil, vice and virtue are founded not on reason but 
upon sentiment. Reason supports ethical behavior by discerning the proper objects of our 
other-oriented moral sentiments and by discerning the complex relations of cause and 
effect.  
 For Hume the condition of humankind in the absence of civilization is not a war 
of all against all. It is a condition in which people, even protohumans, care for perhaps a 
small circle of friends and cooperate with them. But it is also a world in which self-
interest and preference for these friends over strangers makes wider cooperation 
difficult—but not impossible. Again, Darwin (1871, p. 100-101):  
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to 
extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, 
though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only 
an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations 
and races. If, indeed, such men are separated from him by great differences in 
appearance or habits, experience unfortunately shews [sic] us how long it is 
before we look at them as our fellow-creatures. Sympathy beyond the confines 
of man, that is humanity to the lower animals, seems to be one of the latest 
moral acquisitions. …This virtue, one of the noblest with which man is 
endowed, seems to arise incidentally from our sympathies becoming more 
tender and more widely diffused, until they are extended to all sentient beings.11   
                                                          
11 It bears noting the similarity here between Bentham and Darwin and pointing out a 
crucial difference. To Bentham extending moral consideration, a sense of kinship, to all 
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The evolutionary and developmental thrust of Darwin’s thinking about morals is evident. 
Hume's thesis, which lies at the heart of Darwin’s consideration of the origins and 
development of ethics, is that at the center and base of morality lies our natural tendency 
to love, care and have sympathy for others and that this is possible because the human 
being is fundamentally and simultaneously a loving, parochial and selfish being.   
 
Aldo Leopold and the Land Ethic 
 
 Aldo Leopold was not a philosopher, nor was he fully an academic, although in 
later life he did have a position at the University of Wisconsin. He was, rather, a long-
time employee of the U.S. Department of Forestry. Nevertheless, he is referred to as ‘the 
father of contemporary environmental ethics’ (Callicott 1982, p. 164) and his book A 
Sand County Almanac is referred to as ‘the bible of the modern conservation movement’ 
(Callicott 1987, p. 3).  
 Leopold, a natural scientist, follows Darwin’s account of the origin and evolution 
of ethics. Leopold writes (1949, p. 109),  
It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the origin of 
species. We know now what was unknown to all the preceding caravan of 
generations: that men are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the 
odyssey of evolution. This new knowledge should have given us by this time a 
sense of kinship with follow-creatures; a wish to live and let live; a sense of 
wonder over the magnitude and duration of the biotic enterprise. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sentient beings depended on the other beings’ capacity to feel pain. To Darwin the 
extension depends on our capacity to feel a sense of kinship with those sentient beings.    
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In the passage quoted above Darwin permits that sympathy can be extended ‘beyond the 
confines of man’ to include ‘the lower animals’ and that this seems to him, to Darwin, to 
be ‘one of the latest moral acquisitions.’  Darwin did not propose that any such extension 
end at this point; he proposed only that it is ‘one of the latest’ extensions. Leopold’s Land 
Ethic, to quote Leopold now, ‘simply enlarges the boundary of the community to include 
soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land’ (1949, p. 204).  
 The implication of this extension is that a land ethic ‘changes the role of Homo 
sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it’ (1949, 
p. 204). This, in turn, implies ‘respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the 
community as such’ (1949, p. 204). Leopold insists only that the term community (our 
community) include among its referents the non-human natural entities—’soils, waters, 
plants, and animals’ (1949, p. 204).   
 This is a significant break with the Western tradition. It is not simply a prudential 
extension of a utilitarian version of environmental ethics. It is capturing a reverence-for-
life ethic but in holistic way. The reverence-for-life ethic associated with Schweitzer 
(1923), Goodpaster (1978) and Taylor (1986) is an individualistic ethic. In the hands of 
Leopold it is a holistic ethic.  
 
A Living Thing 
 
 Our dominant way of looking at the world is mechanistic (Merchant 1980, 1998, 
2006, 2008a, 2008b; Kinsley 1995, Chapter 10; Descartes). We do not always appreciate 
the degree and the extent to which we are imprisoned by this metaphor. In Metaphysic of 
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Ethics Kant writes, ‘man has no duties imposed upon him, except those owed by him to 
humanity’ and that ‘Mankind can … have no duty toward any being other than his 
fellow-men,’ continuing, ‘In regard of the BEAUTIFUL [sic] but lifeless objects in 
nature …’ (1986, p. 258-260). This passage is part of a discussion of why it is wrong, 
aesthetically, to wantonly destroy non-human nature. The point here, however, is the 
unquestioned acceptance that everything other than the animated is, however beautiful, 
lifeless.  
 Leopold writes that it is inconceivable that ‘an ethical relation to land can exist 
without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value’ (1949, p. 
223), by which Leopold meant intrinsic and not simply instrumental value. How can one 
love the lifeless?  If the biotic community is to be loved, one must emancipate oneself 
from the mechanical metaphor, indeed a very difficult task. It is a task Leopold 
accomplished for himself.  
 In a 1920s essay that remained unpublished until 1979, Leopold explains our 
ethical issue in characteristic brevity and clarity (Leopold 1979, all quotations are from 
pages 138-139). He begins, ‘A false front of exclusively economic determinism is so 
habitual to Americans in discussing public questions that one must speak in the language 
of compound interest to get a hearing.’ He goes on to say, ‘In past and more outspoken 
days conservation was put in terms of decency rather than dollars,’ and then quotes 
Ezekiel:  
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Seemeth it a small thing unto you to have fed upon good pasture, but ye must 
tread down with your feet the residue of your pasture? And to have drunk of the 
clear waters, but ye must foul the residue with your feet?  
Leopold suggests that in these two sentences ‘may be found an epitome of the moral 
question involved,’ further commenting, ‘It is possible that Ezekiel respected the soil, not 
only as a craftsman respects his material, but as a moral being respects a living thing.’  
 Aware of the pitfalls of language, Leopold continued: ‘The very words living 
thing have an inherited and arbitrary meaning derived not from reality, but from human 
perceptions of human affairs.’  He then tackles our inherited and arbitrary perception of 
an inanimate, mechanistic nature by quoting the philosopher Ouspensky (1922):  
Were we to observe, from the inside, one cubic centimeter of the human body, 
knowing nothing of the existence of the entire body and of man himself, then the 
phenomena going on in this little cube of flesh would seem like elemental 
phenomena in inanimate nature.  
Leopold then indicates that Ouspensky suggested, quoting Leopold now,  
[I]t is at least not impossible to regard the earth’s parts—soil, mountains, rivers, 
atmosphere, etc.—as organs, of parts of organs, or a coordinated whole, each 
part of a definite function. And, if we could see this whole, as a whole, through a 
great period of time, we might perceive not only organs with coordinated 
functions, but possibly also that process of consumption and replacement which 
in biology we call the metabolism, or growth. In such a case we would have all 
the visible attributes of a living thing, which we do not now realize to be such 
because it is too big, and its life processes too slow. And there would also follow 
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that invisible attribute—a soul, or consciousness—which not only Onpensky 
[sic], but many philosophers of all ages, ascribe to all living things and 
aggregations thereof, including the “dead” earth.  
 In short, the moral issue to Leopold is that we approach conservation from a 
strictly economic point of view—and that our economic (as well as scientific) point of 
view rests, in turn, on a perception of the other-than-human as mechanistic, inanimate 
and lifeless. Leopold was of the same voice as Hans Jonas who wrote (1984, p. 8), ‘We 
should keep ourselves open to the thought that natural science may not tell the whole 
story about Nature.’  Leopold does not, to my recollection, say that the Land Ethic 
requires acceptance that the other-than-human world is a living thing. Accepting that the 
earth might be a living entity may be necessary for developing a genuine and deep ‘love 
and respect’ for it.12   
 Just as utilitarianism has its maxim (the greatest good for the greatest number) 
and Kantian ethics has its maxim (act in such a way that you can will that your actions 
should become a universal law), Leopold, too, distilled a general maxim, an overarching 
imperative, as a guide to conduct in respect to the environment (1949, p. 224-225):  
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of 
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends to do otherwise. 
This maxim is presented in the context of Leopold’s discussion of the obstacles that lie in 
the way of developing a Land Ethic. Chief among those obstacles, ‘the ‘key-log’ which 
must be moved,’ is our habit of ‘thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic 
                                                          
12 The parallels here with James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis, or Gaia Theory, have not 
escaped me. See Lovelock 1987, 2006, 2010; Primaves 2000; and especially Aram 1996, 
Jones 1996, Rawles 1996, Sahtouris 1996).   
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problem.’  Economics determines, in a limiting way, what can be done for land. ‘It 
always has and it always will.’  The fallacy that ‘economic determinists have tied around 
our collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is the belief that economics 
determines all land-use. This is simply not true.’  As Leopold states it (1949, p. 214),  
a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly 
lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in 
the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) 
essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic 
parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts.  
 To apply this maxim, to know what preserves and what disrupts the integrity, 
stability and beauty of a biotic community, requires some degree of ecological literacy, 
something we do not now have—a point that Leopold, himself, observed and considered 
to be another major impediment to the evolution of a land ethic.  
 
An Example and Implications for Marketers 
 
 Leopold’s Land Ethic is opposed to our contemporary push to make the business 
case for sustainability (to use a contemporary term). Leopold was concerned about this. 
In the 1920s piece cited above he wrote, ‘one must speak in the language of compound 
interest to get a hearing.’  In other words, one must make the business case to get a 
hearing. Leopold also addressed this issue in ‘The Land Ethic.’  Under the heading 
‘Substitutes for a Land Ethic’ (pp. 210-212) he discusses the ‘weakness in a conservation 
system based wholly on economic motives.’  Simply, it is that ‘most members of the land 
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community have no economic value.’  He suggests that of the ‘22,000 higher plants and 
animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtful whether more than 5 per cent can be sold, fed, 
eaten, or otherwise put to economic use. Yet these creatures are members of the biotic 
community and if (as I believe) its stability depends on its integrity, they are entitled to 
continuance.’   
 He then discusses wildflowers, songbirds, predatory mammals, raptorial birds, 
fish-eating birds, certain species of trees and entire biotic communities (marshes, bogs, 
dunes and deserts). He makes the same point for each: to save them we invent 
subterfuges to give them economic importance. In the example of songbirds he writes, 
At the beginning of the century songbirds were supposed to be disappearing. 
Ornithologists jumped to the rescue with some distinctly shaky evidence to the 
effect that insects would eat us up if birds failed to control them. The evidence 
had to be economic in order to be valid.  
If we had a land ethic, an environmental ethic, we would have extended to wildflowers, 
songbirds, predatory mammals and the rest ‘as a matter of biotic right,’ the right to 
simply exist—regardless of the presence or absence of economic advantage to us.     
 Consider now the contemporary case of the Pacific yew (Taxus brevifoliai), a tree 
that grows primarily in California, Oregon and Washington (New York Times 1987; Egan 
1991; Kolata 1991; Hanson 1992, Gersmann and Aldred 2011, Kilham 2013). It is related 
to species in England, Western Europe, Russia, China, Japan, Afghanistan, India and 
Pakistan. Of all these species, the Pacific yew is the largest.  
 It is also one of the slowest growing trees in the world—growing at less than one-
tenth the rate of the Douglas fir, under the shade of which the Pacific yew grows. The 
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Forest Service classifies the Pacific yew as a weed tree with no value. As such it was 
typically destroyed as part of traditional clear-cutting forestry practices. After ripping out 
the yews and all other non-commercial trees in a section, loggers would place them in 
piles of brush and burn them.  
 It is not considered endangered species, so why do we talk about this worthless 
weed tree today?  Because in 1961 we discovered it was a potential source of naturally 
occurring compound that might be used to treat cancer, particularly ovarian cancer and 
possibly lung cancer. In 1979 it was discovered how the compound, taxol, worked to kill 
cancer cells and in 1989 it was figured out how to make it soluble (which was necessary 
to administer it).  Promising clinical results then followed. The problem is that it takes six 
100-year-old Pacific yews to treat one patient.  
 Today the business case for the Pacific yew is easy to make. We recognize its 
potential medicinal uses, its health benefits—and probable profits to be earned. But how 
would we have made the business case for the Pacific yew in 1960?  And how do we 
make the business case now for the other non-commercial trees ripped out and burned 
with the yew?  If we focused not on the individual trees but on the biotic community as 
such, and if we gave that biotic community, to which we also belong, the right to exist, 
we would not have been wantonly burning the yew and other weeds trees just because 
they had no commercial value.  
  To return to Aldo Leopold (p. 213),  
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There is a clear tendency in American conservation13 to relegate to government 
all necessary jobs that private land-owners fail to perform. … Industrial 
landowners and users, especially lumbermen and stockmen, are inclined to wail 
long and loudly about the extension of government ownership and regulation to 
land, but (with notable exceptions) they show little disposition to develop the 
only visible alternative; the voluntary practice of conservation on their own 
lands.  
 Of the farmer he wrote, ‘we asked the farmer to do what he conveniently could to 
save his soil, and he has done just that, and only that’ (p. 209). We have not told the 
farmer the magnitude of his obligations.  
Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is 
the extension of the social conscience from people to land. …No important 
change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our 
intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions. (pp. 209-210).  
What Leopold says of the farmer we could, and should, say of business today: we have 
obligations and those obligations have no meaning without conscience. The challenge for 
marketers is to extend the social conscience from people to the rest of the biotic 
community.  
 As conceived by Leopold the land ethic is not about preserving everything in 
its natural state. It is not about preventing the use of resources (natural capital). He 
wrote (p. 204),  
                                                          
13 Leopold’s concept of conservation is not too far removed from some meanings of our 
word sustainability. Conservation, he wrote, is our effort to understand and preserve “the 
capacity of the land for self-renewal (p. 221). 
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A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management, and use of 
these ‘resources,’ but it does affirm their right to continued existence, and, at 




 As I stated above, I do not believe we are ready for an environmental ethic, an 
ethic that embraces, respects and gives moral consideration to everything and not simply 
to human beings or to sentient animals. In the meantime, and until we are, we can at least 
go part way and give moral consideration to some aspects and some components of the 
non-human natural environment.  
 Using any of these extended theories for making decisions that impact the 
environment—and all decisions impact the environment—is far better than not caring 
about the environment at all or continuing with the presumption that non-human nature is 
so grand, so huge, that nothing we can have a negative impact.  It is, after all, our life 
support system. Whatever extensionist ethic one is most comfortable accepting, realize 
that whichever approach one adopts it has deficiencies and difficulties.  One must realize, 
too, that its validity cannot be convincingly demonstrated to those who begin from 
different presumptions and assumptions.  
 I leave many questions unanswered. This is in part because of space constraints. It 
is also because I do not have the answers. The present course of environmental 
destruction and all its attendant ills is so great that every intellectual tradition, the 
religious and the secular, is today searching for another approach, one consistent with its 
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own tradition, to understanding and recasting the relationship between the human and the 
non-human. Leopold’s Land Ethic is not necessarily the one and only solution. It does, 
however, give an idea of what an environmental/ecological ethic might look like. And it 
does connect with the Enlightenment tradition, something Hinchman and Hinchman 
(2001) have argued is important in and of itself. Finally, Leopold’s Land Ethic also 
connects to the specific socio-economic tradition of which marketing is a part, the one 
emanating from Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment. In the end, Lynn White 
(1967) might well have been correct that the environmental crisis is, at root, a spiritual 
crisis. To this Leopold would agree.  
 I began with a passage from Roger S. Gottlieb’s A Greener Faith: Religious 
Environmentalism and Our Planet’s Future (2006). I end with a thought from E.B. White 
(2006):  
I would feel more optimistic about a bright future for man if he spent less time 
proving he can outwit Nature and more time tasting her sweetness and 
respecting her seniority. 
To this Leopold would also agree.   
 
References  
Abram, David (1996), “The Mechanical and the Organic: Epistemological Consequences 
of the Gain Hypothesis,” in Gaia in Action: Science of the Living Earth edited by 
Peter Bunyard. Edinburgh: Floris Books. 
Bain, Alexander (1868), Mental and Moral Science. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Baxter, William F. (1974), People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution (New 
York: Columbia University Press).  
Belz, Frank-Martin and Ken Peattie (2009), Sustainability Marketing: A Global 
Perspective. John Wiley & Sons. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1789), Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
Chapter 17, Section 1, footnote to paragraph 4.  
Benton, Raymond, Jr. (1985), “Alternative Approaches to Consumer Behavior,” in 
Research in Marketing: Changing the Course of Marketing: Alternative 
Paradigms for Widening Marketing Theory, edited by Nikhilkesh Dholakia and 
Johan Arndt. Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, Inc.  
Bookchin, Murray (1962) (writing under the name Lewis Herber), Our Synthetic 
Environment. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.  
Boulding, Kenneth E. (1966), The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in H. 
Jarrett (ed.), Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy. Baltimore, MD: 
Resources for the Future/Johns Hopkins University Press (pp. 3-14).  
Callicott, J. Baird (1982), “Hume’s Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to 
Leopold’s Land Ethic,” Environmental Ethics 4 (): 163-174. 
__________, editor (1987), Companion to A Sand County Almanac: Interpretive & 
Critical Essays. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.  
Carson, Rachel (1962), Silent Spring. New York: Houghton Mifflin  
Commoner, Barry (1971), The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology. New York: 
Knopf. 
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Curry, Patrick (2006), Ecological Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity 
Press. 
Darwin, Charles (1981, originally 1871), The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation 
to Sex, with an introduction by J.T. Bonner and R.M. May. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Descartes, René (1993), “Animals are Machines,” in Environmental Ethics: Divergence 
and Convergence, edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Boltler. New 
York: McGraw-Hill.  
Egan, Timothy (1991), “Carving Out a Market for Oregon’s Yew Tree,” New York Times 
(May 31). http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/31/us/carving-out-a-marketing-for-
oregon-s-yew-tree.htm (accessed on February 7, 2014).  
Ehrlich, Paul R. (1971), The Population Bomb. Buccaneer Books.  
Fisk, George (1974), Marketing and the Ecological Crisis. New York: Harper & Row. 
Flew, Anthony (1967), Evolutionary Ethics. London: Macmillan.  
Fuller, Donald A. (1999), Sustainable Marketing: Managerial-Ecological Issues. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.  
Geertz, Clifford (1973), “The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind,” Chapter 3 
in The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, Inc.  
Gersmann, Hanna and Jessica Aldred (2011), “Medicinal Tree Used in Chemotherapy 
Drug Faces Extinction,” The Guardian (9 November) accessed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/nov/10/iucn-red-list-tree-
chemotherapy) 
Goldsmith, Edward (1972), Blueprint for Survival. Penguin Books.   
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Goodpaster, Kenneth (1978), “On Being Morally Considerable,” Journal of Philosophy 
75: 308-325.  
Gottlieb, Roger S. (2006), A Greener Faith: Religious Environmentalism and Our 
Planet’s Future. NY: Oxford University Press. 
Griffin, Donald R. (2001), Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Gunn, Alastair S. (1983), “Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals,” 
Environmental Ethics 5 (2): 133-154. 
Hanson, Betsy (1992), “Yews in Trouble,” Discover 13 (January): 55.  
Hardin, Garrett (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (Dec): pp. 1243-
1248. 
__________ (1969), “The Economics of Wilderness,” Natural History 78(6): pp. 20-27. 
Henion, Karl E. II (1976), Ecological Marketing. Columbus, Ohio: Grid. 
Hinchman, L. P. & Hinchman, S. K. (2001), “Should Environmentalists Reject the 
Enlightenment?” The Review of Politics 63 (4): 663-692. 
Sierra Club (2014), “David Brower (1912-2000): Grand Canyon Battle Ads,” 
(http://content.sierraclub.org/brower/grand-canyon-ads/) (accessed July 12, 2014). 
Kilham, Chris (2013), “Pacific Yew: A Potent Cancer Fighting Agent,” FoxNews.com 
(http://www.foxnews.com/health/2013/08/21/pacific-yew-potent-cancer-fighting-
agent/) (accessed on February 7, 2013). 
Hughes, J. Donald (1975), Ecology in Ancient Civilizations. Albuquerque, NM: 
University of New Mexico Press.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




__________ (1994), Pan’s Travail: Environmental Problems of the Ancient Greeks and 
Romans.  
Hume, David (1978, originally 1739), A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition, P.H. 
Nidditch (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.   
Jonas, Hans (1984), The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Alwyn K. (1996), “A Gaian Critique of Contemporary Social Theory,” in Gaia in 
Action: Science of the Living Earth edited by Peter Bunyard. Edinburgh: Floris 
Books. 
Kant, Immanuel (1886), The Metaphysic of Ethics, 3rd edition, trans. by J.W. Semple, ed. 
with Introduction by Rev. Henry Calderwood. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.  
Kilham, Chris (2013), “Pacific Yew: A Potent Cancer Fighting Agent,” FoxNews.com 
(http://www.foxnews.com/health/2013/08/21/pacific-yew-potent-cancer-fighting-
agent/) (accessed on February 7, 2013). 
Kinsley, David (1995), Ecology and Religion: Ecological spirituality in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Kohák, Erazim (2000), The Green Halo: A Bird’s Eye View of Ecological Ethics. Open 
Court Publishing Company.  
Kolata, Gina (1991), “Tree Yields a Cancer Treatment, But Ecological Cost May Be 
High,” New York Times May 13 (accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/13/us/tree-yields-a-cancer-treatment-but-
ecological-cost-may-be-high.html on February 5, 2014) 
Leopold, Aldo (1949), A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




__________ (1979), “Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest,” 
Environmental Ethics 1 (Summer): 131-141.  
Lo, Y. S. (2009), "Callicott, J. Baird 1941–." Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and 
Philosophy. Ed. J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman. Vol. 1. Detroit: 
Macmillan Reference USA.  
Lovelock, James (1987), Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
__________ (2006) The Revenge of Gaia: Earth's Climate in Crisis and the Fate of 
Humanity. New York: Basic Books. 
__________ (2010), The Vanishing Face of Gaia: a Final Warning. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Lowdermilk, Walter C. (1940), “The Eleventh Commandment,” American Forests 46 
(January): 12-15. 
MacIver, A.M. (1948), “Ethics and the Beetle,” Analysis 8 (5): 65-70.  
Marietta, Don E. (1993), “Environmentalism and Individuals,” in Environmental Ethics: 
Divergence and Convergence, second edition edited by Susan Armstrong and 
Richard Botzler. Boston: McGraw-Hill.  
Marsh, George Perkins (1864), Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by 
Human Action. New York: Charles Scribner  
__________ (1874), The Earth as Modified by Human Action: Man and Nature. New 
York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co.   
Martin, Diane and John Schouten (2012), Sustainable Marketing. Prentice Hall.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Meadows, Donella, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers and William W Behrens III 
(1972), The Limits to Growth: A Report for The Cub of Rome’s Project on the 
Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books.  
Merchant, Carolyn (1980), The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific 
Revolution. San Francisco: Harper & Row.  
__________ (1998), “The Death of Nature: A Retrospective,” Organization & 
Environment 11(2): 198-206. 
__________ (2006), “The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature,” Isis 97: 513-
533.  
__________ (2008a), “Secrets of Nature: The Bacon Debates Revisited,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 69 (1): 147-162.  
__________ (2008b), “The Violence of Impediments: Francis Bacon and the Origins of 
Experimentation,” Isis 99: 731-760.  
Morell, Virginia (2013), Animal Wise: the Thoughts and Emotions of Our Fellow 
Creatures. New York: Random House.  
Neace, M. Bill (1995), “Marketing’s Linear-Hierarchical Underpinnings and a Proposal 
for a Paradigm Shift in Values to Include the Environment,” Chapter 4 in 
Environmental Marketing: Strategies, Practice, Theory, and Research edited by 
Michael J. Polonsky and Alma T. Mintu-Wimsatt. Binghamton, NY: The 
Haworth Press. 
New York Times (1987), “Demand for Yew Tree Concerns Environmentalists,” May 3 
(accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/03/demand-for-yew-tree-concerns-
environmentalists.html on February 6, 2014) 
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Newton, Lisa H. (2005), Business Ethics and the Natural Environment. Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.  
Ouspensky, P.D. (1922) Tertium Organum, second American edition. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf. 
Passmore, John (1974), Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and 
Western Traditions. Gerald Duckworth & Co.  
Peterson, Mark (2013), Sustainable Enterprise: A Macromarketing Approach. Sage 
Publications.  
Polonsky, Michael J. and Alma T. Mintu-Wimsatt, editors, (1995), Environmental 
Marketing: Strategies, Practice, Theory, and Research. Binghamton, NY: The 
Haworth Press. 
Primavesi, Anne (2000), Sacred Gaia: Holistic Theology and Earth System Science. New 
York: Routledge.  
Radin, Paul (1927), Primitive Man as Philosopher. New York: D. Appleton Co.  
Rawles, Kate (1996), “Ethical Implications of the Gaia Theory,” in Gaia in Action: 
Science of the Living Earth edited by Peter Bunyard. Edinburgh: Floris Books. 
Regan, Tom (1983), The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.  
Rolston III, Holmes (1975), “Is there an Ecological Ethic?”  Ethics: An International 
Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 18 (2): 93-109.  
Routley, Richard (1973), “Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?”  
Proceedings of the XV World Congress on Philosophy, pp. 205-210.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Sahtouris, Elisabet (1996), “The Gaia Controversy: a Case for the Earth as an Evolving 
Organism,” in Gaia in Action: Science of the Living Earth edited by Peter 
Bunyard. Edinburgh: Floris Books. 
Schumacher, E.F. (1973), Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New 
York: Harper & Row.  
Schweitzer, Albert (1929 [1923]), Civilization and Ethics, second edition translated by 
C.T. Campion. London: A & C Black, Ltd.  
Seuss, Dr. (1971), The Lorax. New York: Random House. 
Sheth, Jagdish N. and Atal Parvatiyar (1995), “Ecological Imperatives and the Role of 
Marketing,” Chapter 1 in Michael J. Polonsky and Alma T. Mintu-Wimsatt, 
editors, Environmental Marketing: Strategies, Practice, Theory, and Research. 
Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press. 
Singer, Peter (1975), Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. 
New York: Random House.  
Sittler, Joseph (1954), “A Theology for Earth,” Christian Scholar 37 (September): 369-
374.  
Smith, Adam (1937, orig. 1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. New York: Modern Library. 
__________ (1976, orig. 1759), Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Classics. 
Stanton, William J. (1981), Fundamentals of Marketing, sixth edition. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Taylor, Paul (1986), Respect for Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Thoreau, Henry David (1854), Walden; or, Life in the Woods. Boston: J.R. Osgood.  
Varner, Gary (2001), “Sentientism,” in A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, Dale 
Jamieson, editor. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.  
Wasserman, Edward and Thomas Zentall, editors (2006), Comparative Cognition: 
Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
WCED (1987), Our Common Future. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Westra, Laura and Thomas M. Robinson, editors (1997), The Greeks and the 
Environment. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
White, E.B. (2006), Letters of E.B. White, revised edition, edited by Dorothy Lobrano 
Guth and Martha White.  New York: Harper.  
White Jr., Lynn (1967), “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science 157: 
1203-1207. 
Woods, Venessa (2010), Bonobo Handshake: A Memoir of Love and Adventure in the 
Congo. New York: Gotham Books.  
 
Further Reading 
Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, and the General Reader 
Benson, John (2000), Environmental Ethics: An Introduction with Readings. New York: 
Routledge.  (Also available as an e-book, 2013.)   
Des Jardins, Joseph R. (2006), Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental 
Philosophy, fourth edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Gottfried, Robert R. (1995), Economics, Ecology, and the Roots of Western Faith: 
Perspectives from the Garden. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.  
Hargrove, Eugene C. (1989), Foundations of Environmental Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
Kohák, Erazim (1999), The Green Halo: A Bird’s Eye View of Ecological Ethics. Open 
Court Publishing Company. (Also available as an e-book, 2011.)  
Newton, Lisa H. (2003), Ethics and Sustainability: Sustainable Development and the 
Moral Life. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  (Also available as an audio 
book, 2004.)    
Peterson, Anna L. (2001), Being Human: Ethics, Environment, and Our Place in the 
World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
Rolston III, Holmes (1988), Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural 
World. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  (Also available as an e-book, 
2012.)    
Wenz, Peter S. (2001), Environmental Ethics Today. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Books of Readings  
Armstrong, Susan J. and Richard G. Botzler, editors (2004), Environmental Ethics: 
Divergence and Convergence, 3rd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Clownew, David and Patricia Mosto, editors (2009), Earth Care: An Anthology in 
Environmental Ethics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Jamieson, Dale, editor (2001), A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers.  
Kalof, Linda and Terre Satterfield, editors (2005), The Earthscan Reader in 
Environmental Values. London: Earthscan.   
Keller, David R. and Frank B. Golley, editors (2000), The Philosophy of Ecology: From 
Science to Synthesis. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.  
Pojman, Louis P. and Paul Pojman, editors (2008), Environmental Ethics: Readings in 
Theory and Application, fifth edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson|Wadsworth.  
Sterba, James P., editor (1995), Earth Ethics: Introductory readings on Animal Rights 
and Environmental Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall   [A second 
edition was published in 2000.] 
Tucker, Mary Evelyn and John A. Grim, editors (1994), Worldviews and Ecology: 
Religion, Philosophy, and the Environment. Mary Knoll, New York: Orbis Books.  
Zimmerman, Michael E., J. Baird Callicott, Karen J. Warren, Irene Klaver and John 
Clark, editors (2005), Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical 
Ecology, fourth edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.  
 
Environmental Ethics for Engineering and Project Managers 
Gorman, Michael E., Matthew M. Mehalik, and Patricia H. Werhane (2000), Ethical and 
Environmental Challenges to Engineering. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Vesilind, P. Aarne and Alastair S. Gunn (1998), Engineering, Ethics, and the 
Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Vromans, Kees, Rainer Paslack, Gamze Yücel Isildar, Rob de Vrind and Jürgen Walter 
Simon (2012), Environmental Ethics: An Introduction and Learning Guide.  
CITY: Greenleaf Publishing 
 
Environmental Ethics for Business 
DesJardins, Joseph R. (2007), Business, Ethics, and the Environment, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.  
Newton, Lisa H. (2005), Business Ethics and the Natural Environment, Wiley-Blackwell. 
Westra, Laura and Patricia Werhane (eds), Business of Consumption: Environmental 




Derr, Patrick G. and Edward M. McNamara (2003), Case Studies in Environmental 
Ethics. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Gudorf, Christine E. and James E. Huchingson (2003), Boundaries: A Casebook in 
Environmental Ethics. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Layzer, Judith A. (2006), The Environmental Case: Translating Values into Policy, 
second edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 
Newton, Lisa H. and Catherine K. Dillingham (1994), Watersheds: Classic Cases in 
Environmental Ethics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.  
Newton, Lisa H. and Catherine K. Dillingham (1996), Watersheds 2: Ten Cases in 
Environmental Ethics. Wadsworth Publishing Co.   
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 




Newton, Lisa H. and Catherine K. Dillingham (2001), Watersheds 3: Ten Cases in 
Environmental Ethics. Wadsworth Publishing Co.   
Newton, Lisa H., Catherine K. Dillingham and Joanne H. Choly (2005), Watersheds 4: 
Ten Cases in Environmental Ethics. Thomson/Wadsworth Publishing Co.   
 
Books with a Religious or Spiritual Orientation 
Gardner, Gary T. (2006), Inspiring Progress: Religions’ Contributions to Sustainable 
Development. New York: W.W. Norton.   
Gardner, Gary T. (2006), Inspiring Progress: Religions’ Contributions to Sustainable 
Development. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.  
Gottlieb, Roger S. (2006), A Greener Faith: Religious Environmentalism and Our 
Planet’s Future. NY: Oxford University Press. 
Gottlieb, Roger S., editor (2006), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Hessel, Dieter and Rosemary Radford Ruether, editors (2000), Christianity and Ecology: 
Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
Martin-Schramm, James B. and Robert L. Stivers (2003), Christian Environmental 
Ethics: A Case Method Approach. Mary Knoll, New York: Orbis Books.   
Spring, David and Eileen Spring, editors (1974), Ecology and Religion in History. New 
York: Harper and Row.  
 
Published in Handbook on Ethics in Marketing, edited by Alexander Nill.  Cheltamham, U.K.: Edward Elgar 





Callicott, J. Baird (1979), “Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability 
and the Biotic Community,” Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring): 71-81.  
Callicott, J. Baird (1980), “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair,” Environmental 
Ethics 2 (Winter): 71-81.  
Callicott, J. Baird (1985), “The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology,” Environmental 
Ethics 8 (Winter): 301-316.  
Callicott, J. Baird (1987). The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,” in Callicott, J. 
Baird, editor, Companion to A Sand County Almanac: Interpretive and Critical 
Essays. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.  
Callicott, J. Baird (1989), In Defense of the Land Ethic. Albany, New York: State 
University of New York Press.  
__________ (2001), “The Land Ethic,” in A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, 
edited by Dale Jamieson. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
__________ (2005). Turning the Whole Soul: The Educational Dialectic of A Sand 
County Almanac. Worldviews: Environment, Culture, Religion, 9, (3): 365-384. 
Marietta, Don E. (1979), “The Interrelationship of Ecological Science and Environmental 
Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 1 (Fall): 195-207.   
 
